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UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON: ITS EFFECT ON THE
RIGHT TO SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARRESTS FOR
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS IN CALIFORNIA
"'M5TERiTHE SUPEME COURT SAYS IF YOU DRIVE VhTIA
A U NT-OWT 'TAIL LIGOIC YOU SELONG TO U5. # I
in United States v. Robinson2 and its companion case, Gustafson
v. Florida,3 the United States Supreme Court held that "full" searches,
that is, those extending beyond a simple "pat-down" and including re-
moval and inspection of any item in the arrestee's possession,' may
1. Copyright 0 1974 Chicago Sun-Times, reproduced by courtesy of Wil-Jo Asso-
ciates, Inc. and Bill Mauldin.
2. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
3. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
4. 414 U.S. at 221-23 n.2. A training instructor for the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment of the District of Columbia testified that "when a police officer makes 'a full
custody arrest,' which he defined as one where an officer 'would arrest a subject and sub-
sequently transport him to a police facility for booking,' the officer is trained to make
a full 'field type search."' Id. That search would include areas behind the collar, un-
der the collar, the waistband, the cuffs, the socks, and the shoes. They are instructed
to examine "'the contents of all of the pockets."' Further, the officer testified that "'we
expect the officer to examine anything he might find on the subject."' Id. In a pat-
down or frisk search, however, the officer is trained not to search further if he deter-
mines by feeling and squeezing the outside of the person's clothing that an object is
,0,0r,__F,.de
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be conducted incident to a "lawful custodial arrest ' 5 (i.e., requiring
transportation to the station house or a magistrate) and are permis-
sible as a "reasonable" search and as an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment.6 Further, the Court decided that
the reasonableness of the manner in which such a search is conducted
is ordinarily not subject to judicial review.7 These decisions afford
less protection to individual liberty than many courts, including those
not an offensive weapon. Id. The stated reasons for all of those policies are the offi-
cer's safety, the safety of the arrested individual, and the discovery of evidence of the
crime. Id.
The officer is instructed not to search the physical area beyond the immediate con-
trol of the arrestee in a crime such as driving after revocation of a license. Id. The
scope of a properly conducted "pat-down" or frisk is described in Terry v. Ohio,
392U.S. 1 (1968):
"[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body.
A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and
back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down
to the feet."
Id. at 17 n.13 (citation omitted).
5. 414 U.S. at 235; 414 U.S. at 265-66. Although the term "lawful custodial arrest"
is not specifically defined in the Robinson or Gustafson cases, the term is used consist-
ently. Both cases involved arrests for which the police officer had the authority to
take the offender into custody (and transport the defendant to the station house) as
opposed to merely being able to issue a citation. 414 U.S. at 221 n.2; 414 U.S. at 265.
The issuing of a citation is, in California, technically an arrest, but the officer has no
authority to take the offender into custody. People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal.
3d 186, 200, 496 P.2d 1205, 1215, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 847 (1972).
6. 414 U.S. at 235; 414 U.S. at 265-66. Robinson and Gustafson were argued and
decided together. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in both cases and was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Jus-
tice Powell wrote one concurring opinion for both cases. Justice Stewart wrote a con-
curring opinion to Gustafson, and Justice Marshall wrote dissenting opinions in both
cases, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
7. Id. The only limitation as to the reasonableness of the manner in which a search
is conducted which was specifically made in Robinson is that it cannot partake of the
kind of physical abuse which violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, such as having the arrestee's stomach pumped to produce contraband swallowed
just prior to the arrest. 414 U.S. at 236. See note 37 infra.
The rejection of the need for case by case review of the reasonableness of the man-
ner in which a search is conducted is a portion of the decision which undoubtedly will
engender criticism. Indeed, the dissenters were most critical of that part of the majority
view. 414 U.S. at 238-39. Justice Marshall wrote:
As we recently held, 'The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-
eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual
context of the individual case." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
But because an exception is invoked to justify a search without a warrant
does not preclude further judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of that search.
It is the role of the judiciary, not of police officers, to delimit the scope of excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.
414 U.S. at 243. See 414 U.S. at 267-68; cf. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d
1082, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1225
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting); Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615, 621
(Fla. Ct. App. 1971). But see State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972).
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of California, have heretofore felt was acceptable.8 The conflict be-
tween the Robinson holding and the California approach compels Cali-
fornia courts to determine whether or not their more protective ap-
proach rests on an independent state ground requiring a broader scope
of protection than that contemplated by the fourth amendment.0 This
Comment will compare the Supreme Court's reasoning with that of
California courts which have dealt with the same or similar issues, in
an effort to determine the effect of Robinson on California law.
I. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Both Robinson and Gustafson arose in the context of valid arrests
for traffic violations made while the defendants were operating motor
vehicles.10 In each case, the arrest was followed by a search con-
ducted at the scene.11 Neither case involved a police officer who
feared for his safety. 2 In the course of each search, the arresting
officer reached into the arrestee's coat pocket and removed an in-
nocent appearing object which was immediately opened, revealing
contraband material.' 3
8. See notes 47-145 infra and accompanying text, discussing People v. Superior Court
(Simon) and other California cases. As to decisions in other jurisdictions, see, e.g.,
Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Mayo, 166
N.E.2d 440 (Ill. 1960); People v. Watkins, 166 N.E.2d 433 (III.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833 (1960); People v. Ziegler, 100 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1960); People v. Gonzales, 97
N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1959); Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1953).
9. Because of the nature of the federal system and because of constitutional and statu-
tory limits on the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, decisions based on
state grounds, which do not violate the minimum protection required by the fourth
amendment, are not subject to review. See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
10. 414 U.S. at 220; 414 U.S. at 261-62.
11. 414 U.S. at 221-23; 414 U.S. at 262.
12. In neither case was the defendant's conduct offensive to the officers. No mention
of circumstances which would support an argument that the officers could reasonably
have feared for their safety was made. The United States conceded in Robinson's case
"that 'in searching respondent, [the officer] was not motivated by a feeling of imminent
danger and was not specifically looking for weapons.'" 414 U.S. at 236 n.7. Justice
Marshall wrote in his dissent in Gustafson that the officer did not in fact believe "that
petitioner was a dangerous person or that the package contained a weapon." 414 U.S.
at 267.
13. The officer in Robinson was conducting a "full field search," in which he would
normally reach into the arrestee's pockets to check the contents. 414 U.S. at 221-23
n.2. See note 4 supra. In Gustafson the officer was conducting a pat-down search
during which he felt an object in Gustafson's coat pocket. 414 U.S. at 262.
The objects in both cases were cigarette packages. Robinson's was a crumpled pack-
age containing fourteen gelatin capsules filled with heroin. 414 U.S. at 223. Gustaf-
son's was a Benson and Hedges cigarette box containing marijuana cigarettes. 414 U.S.
at 262.
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In Robinson, the presence of probable cause to make the arrest,
for the offense of operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his
operator's permit and for obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, was
undisputed.14  The laws of the District of Columbia specified that this
offense was punishable by a mandatory-minimum jail term and/or a
fine. 5 Police regulations directed that this particular traffic offense
required an arrest and transportation to the stationhouse for booking."'
Additionally, written police procedure in the event of such a "'full cus-
tody arrest'" required a "full 'field type search,' ",' which meant re-
moval and examination of any items found in the arrestee's pockets.
In Gustafson, probable cause to make the "full custody arrest" was
also conceded,' 8 but under the applicable Florida laws there was no
14. In Robinson's case the arresting officer had stopped him four days earlier, also
while Robinson was driving his vehicle, and had conducted a "routine spot check."
The officer asked to see Robinson's operator's permit andi after checking it and other
identification, permitted Robinsori to continue on his way evei tbough there was a dis-
crepancy in the birthdates on the identification presented. The discrepancy was in the
dates of birth indicated on an operator's permit and a Selective Service card presented
by Robinson. The permit indicated that he was born in 1938 while the other identi-
fication showed a date of birth of 1927. 414 U.-S. at 239-40.
During the interim prior to the arrest of Robinson, the officer determined from a
personal examination of police records that Robinson's license had been revoked and
that he apparently had obtained another license fraudulently. The police records indi-
cated
that an operator's permit issued to Willie Robfilgon, Jr., born in 1927, had been
revoked and that a temporary operator's permit hod subsequently been issued to
one Willie Robinson, Jr., born in 1938. The pictures on the revoked permit and
on the application for the temporary permit were of the same man-the person
stopped by [officer] Jenks for the routine check on April 19th.
Id. at 239-40. It was pointed out that in the course of his investigation, the officer also
could have discovered information regarding prior narcotics convictions of Robinson.
Id. at 221 n.1.
15. Id. at 220. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 40-302(d) (1973) provides:
Any individual found guilty of operating a motor vehicle in the District during
the period for which his operator's permit is revoked or suspended ...under this
chapter shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500,
or imprisoned not less than 3G days nor more than one year, or both.
16. For "the crime of operating a motor vehicle after revocation of an operator's per-
mit, the officer shall make a summary arrest of the violator and take the violator, in
custody, to the stationhouse for booking." D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Gen-
eral Order No. 3, series 1959 (Apr. 24, 1959), quoted in 414 U.S. at 223 n.2.
17. 414 U.S. at 221-23 n.2. See note 4 supra. This type of search would normally
be conducted while the arrestee is leaning against a wall, spread-eagle fashion. Here,
presumably because cif the officer's height and weight advantage, the search was con-
ducted face-to-face. 414 U.S. at 240-41.
18. 414 U.S. at 262. Justice Stewart, in an opinion concurring with the majority
in Gustafson, stated that the "claim might have been rrade . . . that the custodial ar-
rest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 266-67. J11stice Powell, in his concurring opin-
ion to both cases, expressed the same doubt that Justice Stewart voiced regarding the
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mandatory minimum sentence for the defendant's offense of failure
to have an operator's license in his possession,'0 nor was there any
administrative requirement regarding "full custody searches" or "full
field type searches." In fact, such procedures were apparently subject
to the unregulated discretion of the arresting officer,20 who in this case
took the suspect into custody "in order to transport him to the station-
house for further inquiry."
'21
In each case, the defendant was charged with unlawful possession
of the items found during the search, -and the evidence seized during
each search was introduced at trial.22 Although both defendants were.
found guilty by the respective trial courts, Robinson's conviction was
reversed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, while
Gustafson's conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida. -
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, based his opinion upon the premise that a search of the
person of the defendant incident to a lawful custodial arrest is a valid
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 4 Indeed,
possible illegality of the arrest of Gustafson: "Mhe petitioner conceded the validity
of the custodial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in Robin-
son." Id. at 238 n.2.
19. Id. at 263.
20. The arresting officer testified that only three or four persons out of every ten
would normally be taken into custody for the offense of driving without a license.
Also, the officer stated it was more likely that a non-resident would be taken into cus-
tody. Id. at 265 n.3.
21. Id. at 262.
22. Id. at 219; 414 U.S. at 261.
Robinson was charged with possession and facilitation of concealment of heroin in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964), and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). The heroin
seized was admitted at the trial; then, on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit (United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (1971)), the case
was remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing regarding the scope of
the search conducted. The results of that hearing were adverse to Robinson. Robin-
son again appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction en banc (United
States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972)), holding that the search and resulting seizure
had violated Robinson's fourth amendment rights. 414 U.S. at 219-20.
Gustafson was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana. The marijuana seized
was admitted into evidence at Gustafson's trial, where he was convicted. His conviction
was reversed by the District Court of Appeal of Florida (Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d
615 (1971)) on the grounds of a fourth amendment violation. The Supreme Court of
Florida subsequently reversed that decision (State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (1972)),
thus upholding Gustafson's conviction.
23. See note 22 supra.
24. Justice Rehnquist wrote that "a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 414 U.S. at 224.
In support of that statement, Justice Rehnquist cited and quoted from a number of Su.
preme Court cases: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United
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the court observed that whatever limitations migtit be placed on the
permissible area of search, beyond the person of the arrestee, "no
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Tra-
piano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). He also relied on a number of earlier
cases: Holker v. Hennessey, 42 S.W. 1090 (Mo. 1897); Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482
(1867); People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583 (N.Y. 1923); Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt.
9 (1848); Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. 245 (Exch. Ireland 1887).
Of the cases cited, the Chiagles case seems to offer the most support for Justice Rehi-
quist's ultimate conclusion that a search incident to an arrest is per se reasonable. 414
U.S. at 235. In Chiagles the court wrote that
t~he basic principle is this: Search of the person is unlawful when the seizure of
the body is a trespass, and the purpose of the search is to discover grounds as
yet unknown for arrest or accusation. Search of the person becomes lawful
when grounds for arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in
the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion.
142 N.E. at 584 (citation omitted). However, the remaining cases seem to place more
emphasis on the factors which are traditionally used to justify a search incident to an
arrest:
Unquestionably. . . the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make
a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the
fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. . . . The rule.. . is justified...
by the need to seize weapons and things which might be used to assault an officer
or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence
of the crime ....
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (emphasis added).
Those cases cited involved factual situations where there was a need to take items
from an arrestee which he might use in procuring an escape, Closson v. Morrison, 47
N.H. 482, 484 (1867); a need to seize evidence of the crime for which the person was
arrested, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 148 (1947); Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9 (1848); or the need to search
for weapons, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Despite the portions of those cases quoted by Justice Rehnquist which support the
right to search incident to an arrest, the cases as a whole seem to call for a "reason-
ableness" limitation to such a search, even though "traditionally" justified. See Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (limit the search to area within which arrestee
might obtain a weapon or evidence); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 706-08
(1948) (held an incident search invalid where there was time to get a warrant: "The
mere fact that there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a search or seizure
without a warrant"), rev'd, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("[t]he
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable"); Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931)
(search incident to arrest pursuant to warrant held unreasonable because of "preten-
sion of right and threat of force" and being "general and apparently unlimited");
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (involved an ongoing crime and
seizure of items in plain view); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)
(search of Agnello's home several blocks from place of arrest held invalid); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (stressing the presence of probable cause to
search arrestee's automobile). See generally Note, Searches of the Person Incident to
Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1969).
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doubt has been expressed as to the unqualified authority of the arrest-
hag officer to search the person of the arrestee.
'25
The limitations on searches of the person set forth in Terry v.
Ohio,2 6 and relied upon by the lower court in Robinson,2 7 were inap-
plicable, the Court held, because 'the Terry search involved a justifi-
able investigative "stop-and-frisk" prior to the establishment of prob-
able cause for arrest, while Robinson was under arrest before the
search.28  Thus Robinson involved a search incident to arrest; Terry
did not. In Terry, the Court stated:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual con-
duct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where . . . he
identifies himself as a policeman. . . and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.29
The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright, had
recognized that the nature of the traffic offense in Robinson was such
that no further evidence could conceivably be found by an additional
search. Therefore, the only potential justification for a search incident
to this specific type of arrest was a search for weapons.80 Thus, Judge
Wright reasoned that the danger presented to an officer in the traffic
arrest situation was more akin to the type of encounter in Terry (justi-
25. 414 U.S. at 225.
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. 471 F.2d at 1097; cf. 447 F.2d at 1233.
28. 414 U.S. at 227. Justice Rehnquist also rejected possible limiting language in
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), sub nom., Sibron v. New York (companion
case to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). In Peters, the officer had probable cause to
arrest, unlike the Terry situation, and the Court, in approving the pat-down search con-
ducted, wrote:
[IThe incident search was obviously justified "by the need to seize weapons and
other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well
as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence. . . ." Moreover, it was rea-
sonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage in an
unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his personal effects.
392 U.S. at 67. Justice Rehnquist stated that Peters did not limit the scope of a search
incident to a lawful arrest, even though "[ilt is, of course, possible to read the second
sentence from this quotation as imposing a novel limitation . . . ." 414 U.S. at 229.
29. 392 U.S. at 30-31.
30. 414 U.S. at 227. See 471 F.2d at 1096-97.
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fying a frisk) than to the typical arrest situation (justifying a "full"
search)."' Justice Rehnquist agreed that evidence requiring preserva-
tion was usually lacking .in the traffic arrest situation,12 but felt that the
other traditional justification for a search incident to a lawful arrest, the
need to disarm the suspect, obviated any argument that the non-arrest
Terry standard should apply.3  The majority did not respond to Justice
Marshall's point in the dissent that, even assuming that this "need to
disarm" permitted -the removal of any or all objects from a lawfully ar-
rested person's pockets, such a need would not appear to necessitate
the opening of any objects taken out. 4 The policy reason advanced
by Justice Rehnquist for allowing such a "full" search-the increased
danger to an officer because of extended exposure following arrest
and transportation in a police vehicle," as compared to the "fleeting"
contact of a Terry "stop-and-frisk"--is simply not responsive to Justice
Marshall's argument.
Nevertheless, this "extended exposure" to danger was considered
by the majority to present such a pervasive threat that ad hoc second-
guessing by appellate courts as to the actual danger present in indivi-
dual cases was specifically denounced:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the per-
son of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick. . . judg-
ment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.38
Thus, in Robinson and Gustafson, the Court eliminated any case-
by-case adjudication of searches conducted incident to a lawful custod-
ial arrest, except in the most extreme circumstances involving actual
physical abuse. 7 If the Robinson rule is generally followed, -the focus
31. 471 F.2d at 1096-98.
32. 414 U.S. at 233.
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 255-56. Justice Marshall simply said that, since the objects which might
possibly constitute the threat to the arresting officer were no longer in the arrestee's
possession, the threat had been eliminated, and thus the officer's safety should not be
a justification for the further intrusion of opening the objects.
35. It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the
case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody
and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting
contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop.
7d. at 234-35.
36. Id. at 235.
37. Id. at 236. The majority here referred to situations which "[partake] of none
of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics which . . . violate the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
1974]
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of attack for defendants in traffic arrest cases, which turn into more
serious charges as the result of an incident search, will be confined
to the lawfulness of the arrest itself 38 and to the question of the of-
ficer's authority to take the offender into custody.
Of course, the crucial question regarding the Robinson decision is
its effect in states such as California which have afforded a signifi-
cantly broader protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
conducted incident to an arrest for a traffic violation.30  The media
has in some instances portrayed Robinson as inviting law enforce-
ment to conduct full searches for very minor offenses.40 What has
not been emphasized is that the Robinson decision need not neces-
sarily have an effect in California or in other states. The states may
sustain, on state grounds, a more restrictive rule regarding the right
of an officer to search in this context than that enunciated in Robin-
son.
41
The problem of conflicting views between the state courts and the
United States Supreme Court in the field of search and seizure limita-
tions imposed by the fourth amendment is, of course, not unique.42
One function of the Supreme Court is to resolve conflicts in the inter-
pretation of the United States Constitution by means of its power to
review state court decisions.48 Generally, however, the Supreme Court
(1952) (arrestee's stomach pumped to obtain morphine he had swallowed).
The key to the application of the Rochin limitation seems to be well expressed in
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954): "But [Rochin v. California] also presented
an element totally lacking here-coercion . . . applied by a physical assault upon his
person to compel submission to the use of a stomach pump." Id. at 133 (emphasis
added). See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (taking of blood permissible);
Comment, Constitutional Law-Evidence-Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence and Due
Process of Law, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1367, 1373-74 (1952); 40 CALIn. L. REv. 311,
317 (1952). But see Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) (cavity
search upheld).
38. A search incident to an arrest would certainly be invalid if the officers have
no probable cause to arrest (cee, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d 186,
198, 496 P.2d 1205, 1214, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 (1972); People v. Gonsoulin, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 270, 96 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1971); People v. Franklin, 261 Cal. App. 2d 703, 68
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1968); Nugent v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 420, 62 Cal. Rptr.
217 (1967)), or if the arrest is a mere pretext for conducting a search. See Amador-
Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); 414 U.S. at 238 n.2 (Powell,
J., concurring).
39. See notes 74-145 infra and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Cops' Credibility, TrmE, Feb. 4, 1974, at 79.
41. See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
42. Illustrative of this conflict are Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Both of those cases discuss the differences between
states in regard to the adoption of the exclusionary rule.
43. See generally C. WRGirr, HANDBooK oF THE LAw oF FEDERAL CouRTs 481-92
(2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
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has no power -to review a state court's interpretation of state law,44 and
as Justice Jackson wrote in Herb v. Ptcairn:45
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the prin-
ciple that it will not review judgments of state courts that Test on ade-
quate and independent state grounds. The reason is so obvious that
it has rarely 'been -thought to warrant statement. It is found in the par-
titioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems and
in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge
federal rights. . . . We are not permitted to render an advisory opin-
ion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court
after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount
to nothing more than an advisory opinion.48
Thus, to assess the impact of the Robinson decision on the contrary
rule which had previously been announced by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Superior Court (Simon),47 it is necessary to deter-
mine whether Simon was based on an adequate and independent state
ground: the California Vehicle Code or article I, section 19 of the Cali-
fornia constitution.
II. CALIFORNIA LAW OF SEARCHES INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC ARRESTS:
TE Simon CASE
Prior to the Robinson and Gustafson cases, the California Supreme
Court in Simon had already confronted the issue of the right to search
incident to a custodial traffic arrest and had sharply limited the per-
missible scope of such searches.
The facts of Simon were virtually identical to those of Gustafson
in that a valid stop was made for a violation of the Vehicle Code,4"
44. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1875); WRIGRT, supra note 43, at 485-88; Bice, Anderson and the Ade-
quate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972).
45. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
46. Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted). The concept whereby an "adequate state
ground" can preclude review by the United States Supreme Court even though a federal
claim has been denied is a concept which has been dealt with in depth by the Court.
See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969); Department of Mental Hygiene v.
Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487
(1965); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117
(1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); Hill, The
Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLum. L. Rnv. 943 (1965); Sandalow, Henry v. Missis-
sippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 St. Or.
R v. 187; Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous
Grounds of Decision, 62 COLuM. L. Rnv. 822 (1962).
47. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
48. Simon, a law student at the University of Southern California, was stopped for
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the driver did not have any identification or registration,4" a lawful
custodial arrest was then made,5" and a pat-down search followed even
though the officer had no fear that the offender was armed. 1  The
officer discovered a soft package in Simon's pocket which contained
marijuana.52 The essential issue posed in each of these cases was the
same: Do the factors of extended custody and transportation of a
traffic offender justify a police search?
The theory on which the California court relied to invalidate the
search conducted under these circumstances was not precisely deline-
ated in the Simon opinion. The three possible bases include the
fourth amendment, the state statutory scheme, and article I, section 19
of the California constitution.53
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Simon opinion's "point of departure" was People v. Superior
Court (Keifer),54 a case which was replete with language referring to the
fourth amendment and United States Supreme Court interpretations of
that constitutional provision. 5 The rule adopted by the state court as
best expressing its aversion to allowing pat-down searches in traffic-ci-
tation "arrests" was that of Terry v. Ohio,5 another Supreme Court in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment. In discussing the "custody" ar-
gument, Justice Mosk, in Simon, wrote that the issue to be considered
was the "constitutionally permissible scope" of searches incident to cus-
driving without headlights or tail-lights, according to the police officer. Simon testified
that he had stopped not because of the police officer's request to do so, but because
the ignition in his 13-year-old car had shorted, causing a fire and the loss of his head-
lights and tail-lights. 7 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 496 P.2d at 1209, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
49. Id. Simon stated that the officers conducted their search before they asked him
for his identification, a significant point which is not clearly resolved in Simon. It is
clear, however, that Simon did not have any identification or registration.
50. Id. at 192, 496 P.2d at 1210, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
51. The Simon court wrote:
Beyond these traffic violations, however, there were no other facts or circum-
stances from which Officer Erickson, as a reasonably prudent man, could have in-
ferred that defendant was carrying a concealed weapon. Indeed, we have already
pointed out that when asked on cross-examination, "Did you at any time fear for
your life ... ?" Officer Erickson replied in the negative.
Id. at 208, 496 P.2d at 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
52. Id. at 192, 496 P.2d at 1209, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
53. See notes 54-135 infra and accompanying text.
54. 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
55. Id. at 812-15, 818, 828-29, 831, 478 P.2d at 451-53, 455, 463-5, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 731-33, 735, 743-45.
56. 7 Cal. 3d at 206, 496 P.2d at 1220, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 852. See text accompany-
ing notes 26-31 supra.
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todial traffic arrests. 7  The court cited and quoted with approval Peo-
ple v. Dukes' s and People v. Mercurio9 (which followed the Dukes'
reasoning), both of which rested on the fourth amendment: "'That
the officers were warranted in taking.., the traffic offenders into cus-
tody for the traffic offenses because of their unsatisfactory identification
does not expand the scope of the search permissible under the Fourth
Amendment .... ."60 Finally, the most significant aspect of the Si-
mon opinion as to the fourth amendment issue was its express disap-
proval of another lower court case, Morel v. Superior Court,1 which had
distinguished Dukes and Mercurio and concluded that "under the ulti-
mate test of the Fourth Amendment, that is, whether the search is or
is not reasonable, the balance weighs against petitioner.
'62
In Morel, the defendant had been validly arrested for a Vehicle
Code infraction and taken into custody by the arresting officer.6 1 The
court had rested its opinion exclusively on the fact of custody requir-
ing transportation:
We hold that when the officer has taken an alleged offender into cus-
tody and is about to transport him, whether to a magistrate only (if
the arrestee is able to make bail) or to some place of detention until
he shall have made bail, the officer may search the person of the
57. 7 Cal. 3d at 208, 496 P.2d at 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 853. The court pointed
out in a footnote that its analysis applied to both mandatory custody and discretion-
ary custody provisions of the Vehicle Code. Id. at 208 n.16, 496 P.2d at 1221 n.16,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 853 n.16.
58. 1 Cal. App. 3d 913, 82 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1969).
59. 10 Cal. App. 3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970).
60. 7 Cal. 3d at 210, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854, quoting People v.
Dukes, 1 Cal. App. 3d 913, 916, 82 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1969). It also should be
noted that the principal case on which the Dukes court relied was Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), a fourth amendment case. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 82 Cal. Rptr. at
220-21. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. Justice Mosk, in Simon, approved
the Dukes-Mercurio line of cases (Agar v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 24, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (1971); Carpio v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 790, 97 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1971); People v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. App. 3d 935, 92 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1971)). 7
Cal. 3d at 210-11, 496 P.2d at 1222-23, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
61. 10 Cal. App. 3d 93, 89 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970). Cases following Morel were also
expressly overruled: People v. Brown, 14 Cal. App. 3d 507, 92 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1971);
Pugh v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 91 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1970).
62. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
63. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 916-17, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. Morel had been observed
engaging in a speed contest, a violation of CAL. VEMCLE CODE ANN. § 23109(a) (West
1971). The arresting officer conducted a search of Morel before transporting him to
appear before a magistrate. The search in this instance was not a mere pat-down, but
was a "thorough" search. During the course of the search the officer felt an object
in Morel's pocket, immediately reached inside and discovered a bottle containing Seco-
barbital capsules. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 915, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
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arrestee.64
The rationale used by the court of appeal was remarkably similar
to that of Justice Rehnquist in Robinson, in that it was the fact of
the custodial arrest itself which justified the thorough search of the
person6" because yf the special duties and dangers involved for police
officers when custody and transporation are effected.06 Like the
United States Supreme Court majority three years later, the Morel
court distinguished Sibron v. New York 67 on substantially the same
ground as that used by Justice Rehnquist in distinguishing its compan-
ion case, Terry v. Ohio, namely, that the issue in Sibron was a pat-
down search before any arrest had occurred.68  Because a valid cus-
todial arrest with subsequent transportation to the police station was
involved in Morel, the court held that the fourth amendment require-
ment that searches be reasonable was met in these circumstances."0
The California Supreme Court's reason for overruling the Morel
theory appeared to rest primarily on the constitutional requirement of
reasonableness:
[We] cannot "hold that, as a matter of law, every person who is to
be transported in a police vehicle, for any reason, may be subjected
to a search . . . . Such a routine invasion of privacy, unsupported
by some special necessity, is constitutionally unwarranted.'
70
Justice Mosk cited with approval the language used by the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Marsh:
71
[T]he ordinary motorist who transgresses against a traffic regulation
"does not thereby indicate any propensity for violence or iniquity," and
the officer who stops him generally "has not even the slightest cause
for thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted."1
72
64. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
65. Id. at 918-19, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 301. Accord, Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S.
at 235. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
In reaching their decisions, the courts in both Morel and Robinson relied on a New
York Case, People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583 (N.Y. 1923) (see note 24 supra), quoted
in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 232, and cited in Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 389
(9th Cir. 1960) (Charles' arrest was made at his home, pursuant to warrants sworn upon
by his wife for assault and battery), which is quoted by Morel (10 Cal. App. 3d at 919,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 301).
66. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 917-18, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
67. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
68. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
69. Id.
70. 7 Cal. 3d at 211, 496 P.2d at 1223, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 855, quoting People v.
Smith, 17 Cal. App. 3d 604, 607, 95 Cal. Rptr. 229, 231 (1971).
71. 228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1967).
72. 7 Cal. 3d at 206, 496 P.2d at 1219, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 851, quoting People v.
Marsh, 228 N.E.2d 783, 786 (N.Y. 1967).
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Thus, one conclusion which can be drawn from the overruling of
Morel is that, contrary to the United States Supreme Court, the Cali-
fornia court felt that danger to police officers in routine, custodial traf-
fic arrests was so unlikely as to be insufficient justification for full
searches.
Therefore, it would appear that Robinson and Gustafson are now
controlling in California, since they are interpretations of the fourth
amendment and since the Supreme Court's views in this respect are
binding on state courts.73 There is another interpretation of Simon, how-
ever, which would enable the California Supreme Court's decision to
withstand the Robinson/Gustafson onslaught: that the statutory scheme
and legislative intent manifested therein was an independent basis for
the Simon holding.
73. Since national constitutional law is the supreme law of the land (see, e.g., McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326-27 (1819)) and since the United States
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the constitution (see, e.g.,
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)), the decisions of the Supreme Court
interpreting federal constitutional provisions are binding. Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U.S.
776, 777 (1964) (per curiam).
The court has indicated in a number of cases dealing with search and seizure issues
that states may develop their own rules as long as they do not infringe on rights guar-
anteed under federal law. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 92 (1964); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). The question is whether, in formulating rules
more protective of constitutional rights than required by the federal constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, state courts may do so on the basis of that same
federal constitutional provision rather than on another basis such as state constitutional
provisions, state statutes, or judicially developed rules.
In a recent New York criminal case, People v. Kelly, No. - (N.Y. Cty. Crim.
Ct., Feb. 13, 1974) (excerpt published, 42 U.S.L.W. 2471 (1974)), the court faced the
dilemma created by the conflict between People v. Marsh, 228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y.
1967) (see notes 71-72 supra) and Robinson. The court in Kelly asked: "Is the court
bound to enforce [the Marsh rule] or is it obliged to follow [Robinson, a] diametri-
cally opposed ruling? Unquestionably the decision herein must be based solely upon
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution." 42 U.S.L.W. at 2471.
The court noted Cooper and Sibron in concluding that:
It appears, therefore, that the [New York] Court of Appeals may not narrow
Fourth Amendment protections further than the Supreme Court dictates, but there
is no prohibition against the State through its highest Appellate Court from ex-
tending such protection.
42 U.S.L.W. at 2472. The obvious difficulties with the Kelly decision are that Marsh
was clearly decided on both federal and state grounds (228 N.E.2d at 785) each inde-
pendently able to sustain that decision, and, secondly, if the fourth amendment means
what the Supreme Court says it means, then a decision clearly inconsistent with a Su-
preme Court decision must necessarily rest on some other ground. Absent reliance on
a state constitutional provision or statute, a court must at least rely on a judicial rule
or policy.
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B. The Statutory Scheme
The California Vehicle Code provides that violations of its provi-
sions fall into three categories: felonies, misdemeanors, and infrac-
tions.7 4  In the case of a felony violation, the offender is treated as is
any other arrestee.75  Thus the felony traffic violator is arrested,
searched, and booked, and the traditional justifications validate the
search. 70  In the case of misdemeanors or infractions, the arrest pro-
cedure is governed by the Vehicle Code provisions77 and, as the Simon
court observed with respect to such violations, "the Legislature has
created a special tripartite scheme which reflects the lesser degree of
criminality attached to the act of transgressing against ordinary traffic
rules and regulations. s78  First, the scheme presumes that, in the vast
majority of cases in which a vehicle operator is stopped, the period of
detention will be limited only to the period necessary to issue a cita-
tion.79 Although this detention and citation process constitutes an "ar-
rest" in the "technical sense,"' 0 no search, transportation, or booking
is involved. Thus, the "citation procedure. . . is essentially an honor
system, requiring the good faith and cooperation of the person cited."8'
The second aspect of the tripartite scheme is that in certain cases,
such as reckless driving or failure to stop after an accident, the officer
is given the option of issuing a citation or of taking the violator "'with-
74. CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40000.1, 40000.3, 40000.5-.28 (West Supp. 1974).
The California Penal Code also provides: "Crimes and public offenses include: 1.
Felonies; 2. Misdemeanors; and 3. Infractions." CAL. PENAL CODE § 16 (West 1972).
75. CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40301 (West 1971).
76. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
77. 7 Cal. 3d at 199, 496 P.2d at 1214, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 846. For example, CAL.
VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40302 (West 1971) provides in part that, "Whenever any person
is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person
shall. . . ." (emphasis added). See note 83 infra.
It should be noted that the distinction between misdemeanors and infractions is also
important since, under the authority of CAL. PENAL CODE § 19c (West 1972), an in-
fraction is not punishable by imprisonment, it does not entitle the defendant to a trial
by jury and does not entitle the defendant to be represented by a public defender, unless
the defendant is not released on his promise to appear, a recognizance bond, or deposit
of bail.
78. 7 Cal. 3d at 199, 496 P.2d at 1214, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
79. 7 Cal. 3d at 199, 496 P.2d at 1215, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 847. CAL. VEHICLE CODE
ANN. § 40500 (West 1971) provides:
Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be
a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic
offenses and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate . . . the arresting
officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court.
80. 7 Cal. 3d at 200, 496 P.2d at 1215, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
81. Id. at 201, 496 P.2d at 1216, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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out unnecessary delay' before the 'nearest or most accessible magis-
trate' .... 1182
Finally, section 40302 requires that the officer must take an
offender before a magistrate in situations such as misdemeanor drunk
driving, refusal to give a written promise to appear, and the situation
existent in the Simon case itself, failure to present a driver's license
"or other satisfactory evidence of . . . identity.""3
In the Simon case, the Attorney General contended that, since the
Vehicle Code required that the defendant be taken to a magistrate
and since the defendant could be searched during the booking process
(to prevent the "introduction of weapons or contraband into the jail
facility" 4), it was permissible ("for the sake of safety") to advance
82. Id. at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854. Arrests of traffic vio-
lators in this instance may be discretionary, as provided in CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN.
§ 40303 (West 1971):
Whenever any person is arrested for any of the following offenses and the arrest-
ing officer is not required to take the person. . . before a magistrate, the arrested
person shall, in the judgment of the arresting officer, either be given a 10 days'
notice to appear as herein provided or be taken without unnecessary delay before
a magistrate within the county ....
(Emphasis added). The specific offenses enumerated include injuring or tampering
with a vehicle, failure or refusal of a driver to stop for various tests and inspections,
speed contests, exhibition of speed, driving with a suspended or revoked license, evasion
of arrest, persons upon vehicular crossings, and failure to stop for an accident involving
property damage. Id.
The officer is required to take the offender into custody for violations of CAL. VE-
HICLE CODE ANN. §§ 23102, 23105 (West 1971), which are related to driving while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. § 40302 (West Supp. 1974).
83. 7 Cal. 3d at 208, 496 P.2d at 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 853. CAL. VEHICLE CODE
ANN. § 40302 (West Supp. 1974) provides that:
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to
be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before
a magistrate. . . where the arrest is made in any of the following cases:
(a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satis-
factory evidence of his identity ....
(b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in
court.
84. 7 Cal. 3d at 208, 496 P.2d at 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 853. See People v. Rogers,
241 Cal. App. 2d 384, 388-90, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-62 (1966); People v. Reed, 202
Cal. App. 2d 575, 579-80, 20 Cal. Rptr. 911, 914 (1962). At least one court has ex-
pressly upheld this theory:
[lin a case where the booking process is both legally required and to be followed,
the fact that the search . . . is made in the field rather than at the police station
does not render same violative of defendant's constitutional rights.
People v. Whitsell, 109 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1973), hearing denied, ordered unpub-
lished (California Supreme Court, Oct. 3, 1973). See Morel v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 913, 917, 89 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1970) (dicta); People v. Dukes, 1 Cal. App.
3d 913, 916, 82 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1969) (dicta). However, the Simon court deter-
mined that, since the arrest provisions of the Vehicle Code provided an exclusive pro-
cedure whereby the normal booking process and jail were avoided, or at least avoidable,
the "jailable offense" theory is not applicable. And, in view of the "unpublishing" or-
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dered for Whitsell, the viability of this theory as justification for field searches is ques-
tionable.
Chief Justice Wright, in his concurring opinion (7 Cal. 3d at 211, 496 P.2d at 1223,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 855), noted what is both a pivotal point in Justice Mosk's majority
opinion and, perhaps, an analytical weakness. Can the Vehicle Code sections be fairly
read to require an immediate release with no possibility of being booked, searched, and
jailed? When a magistrate decides that bail is required rather than a mere written
promise to appear and when the arrestee cannot post the amount of bail required, Chief
Justice Wright, correctly it seems, concluded that a search would be not only possible,
but also necessary. 7 Cal. 3d at 214-15, 496 P.2d at 1226, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
Since the statute provides for release on posting of bail or a written promise to ap-
pear (CAL. VEHICLE CODE Am. § 40306 (West 1971); id. § 40307 (West Supp.
1974)), the official's determination that bail is appropriate necessarily implies that pay-
ment thereof is a condition for utilizing this method of release from custody. The "writ-
ten promise" method, if used, is chosen at the outset by the official, when the arrestee is
presented. 7 Cal. 3d at 215 n.4, 496 P.2d at 1226 n.4, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.4.
It is not an alternative to be used if the arrestee has insufficient funds to post bail.
A subsequent failure to sign a written promise, after agreeing to do so, must be consid-
ered as roughly analogous to the subsequent failure to post sufficient money to meet
the bail which has been set.
While Chief Justice Wright's analysis is correct on the face of the majority opinion,
the express acknowledgement by the court of an exception to their "immediate release"
theory, where the arrestee must be detained because of intoxication (7 Cal. 3d at 209
n.17, 496 P.2d at 1222 n.17, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854 n.17), would seem to allow for
another exception, that of insufficient funds to meet bail. Perhaps this possibility was
too obvious to be mentioned. In any event, the general statutory intent that traffic
arrestees be detained for the minimum amount of time possible is clear. Id. Given
these logical exceptions, the majority's interpretation that any detention is required to
be so brief that it amounts to a right of immediate release is not as unreasonable as
Chief Justice Wright's analysis seems to suggest.
It certainly is true that the release procedure is markedly different in Vehicle Code
violation cases than in "normal" criminal misdemeanor (Penal Code) cases, as re-
flected in a line of lower court cases approved in Simon. See note 60 supra. In Penal
Code cases, even though there are strong statutory presumptions making quick release
on bail virtually mandatory (see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270-71 (West 1972) (de-
fendant entitled to bail "as a matter of right" except in capital cases)), the process does
involve an initial booking, which traditionally justifies a search incident thereto (see
People v. Rogers, 241 Cal. App. 2d 384, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1966); People v. Reed, 202
Cal. App. 2d 575, 20 Cal. Rptr. 911 (1962)) and then appearance before a magistrate
and setting of bail. As interpreted, the Vehicle Code requires release on bail or written
promise prior to booking. 7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
At least implicitly, Justice Mosk assumed in Simon that, in actuality, the vast majority
of traffic arrestees are released within minutes of arrival at a magistrate's office or a
jail. Otherwise, his statement that these persons could not lawfully be subjected to the
booking process and incident search (id.) would make no sense, since intoxicated per-
sons and those without sufficient funds for bail would be incarcerated and thus booked
and searched. It is arguable, absent empirical data, and given the statutory requirement
that bail be available in most criminal cases, that persons arrested for "criminal" mis-
demeanors, even though "booked," actually spend no more time in police custody than
the traffic offender awaiting release by a magistrate or an officer in charge of a jail.
Consequently, the technical distinction which Justice Mosk effectively drew between
normal criminal misdemeanants as being "jailable," and thus subject to a search, and
the absence of justification for the search of a traffic offender because the offense is
19741 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
the time of search to the time of the arrest.8 5 The court responded
by stating that, "[w]hatever the merits of this argument in generality,
it is inapplicable to the case at hand."80 The court relied on the pro-
visions commanding that the offender be taken "without unnecessary
delay" to the nearest magistrate and must then be provided the oppor-
tunity to post bail or sign a promise to appear and is then entitled
to be released.87  The court interpreted these provisions to mean that
not "jailable," is questionable. The difference between where the offender is tempo-
rarily detained, in a jail or in a magistrate's office, seems less important than the fact
that he is being detained by the police. As Chief Justice Wright noted, there is no
more cause to believe that one arrested for a minor crime such as petty theft is armed
than there is to believe that a traffic arrestee is not armed. Id. at 214, 496 P.2d at 1225,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 857. In either case, if the arrestee is armed, a substantial threat
is posed. Simply because the legislature, in the court's opinion, contemplated minimal
detentions of traffic violators does not mean that the court should ignore the practical-
ities of traffic arrests. If in fact there is no substantial difference in the respective
periods of detention, and assuming the correctness of Chief Justice Wright's view of
the equivalent threat posed by both types of offenders, the assumption that traffic vio-
lations are inherently "non-jailable," that is, arrestees are actually rarely incarcerated,
loses some of its validity. One of the traditional justifications for searches incident
to arrest, the need to disarm (see note 23 supra), is still valid in California, and it
should make little difference whether the particular offense is "jailable." Rather, if
protection of police officers is a valid goal, the court should look to the actual period
of detention involved and the actual threat posed in each custodial arrest. The Simon
opinion, if it is capable of supporting booking searches, assumes that the introduction of
weapons into a jail is a greater evil than the failure to protect a police officer. While
one could imagine reasons that would support such a preference, it is hard to believe
that such a preference could dictate a policy difference, let alone one of constitutional
dimensions.
85. 7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
86. Id. at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
87. Id. See CAL. VEMCLE CODE ANN. § 40306 (West 1971); id. §§ 40302, 40303,
40307 (West Supp. 1974). In the case of all misdemeanor and infraction offenses there
must be a schedule of bail adopted. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(b) (West Supp. 1974).
In the case of a warrant issued for outstanding traffic violations, the issuing judge must
endorse upon the warrant a signed statement authorizing bail and establishing the amount
of bail. CAL. PENAL CODE § 815(a) (West 1972). When brought before the appropriate
official, the offender must be given an opportunity to post bail and then be released if
he does so. People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101
Cal. Rptr. at 854.
Several California appellate courts have dealt with the issue of what an opportunity
to post bail entails. In People v. Aylwin, 31 Cal. App. 3d 826, 107 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1973), a driver was arrested for driving erratically at high speeds. Four separate
searches were conducted. The important one, regarding the opportunity to post bail,
was the fourth one, conducted at the police station prior to booking, which revealed
a note in his hat band that led to information used at his trial. The court wrote:
Wiggins was not given the opportunity to make bail on the traffic violation. He
did have something over $50 on his person, and he testified that had he been in-
formed he might have arranged to have some additional money sent to him. He
was not given the opportunity. ...
31 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 832. But see People v. Rhodes, 23 Cal.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
no booking could be countenanced. Instead, the court indicated that
the Vehicle Code prescribed the exclusive procedure to be followed
in custodial traffic arrests and that it required that the offender be
taken directly to a magistrate and immediately released on bail or writ-
ten promise to appear.8
8
Thus, the Vehicle Code rendered the booking argument of the
Attorney General inapplicable;89 in addition, there is language in the
opinion which could be used to support the view that ,the statutory
scheme invalidated a search incident to the transportation process as
well.90 In the midst of his fourth amendment discussion, Justice Mosk
used language embracing policy justifications which could be construed
to be derived from the statutory scheme. At the very least, a consider-
App. 3d 257, 100 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1972), where the court said that the evidence
"establishe[d] that defendant could not have posted bail even had she been given the op-
portunity." Id. at 259, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Bail in this case was $127, and defendant
had only $6.23. Id. at 258, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
In Carpio v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 790, 97 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1971), the
court stated:
However, both the speeding violation and the Imperial County warrant were mat-
ters entitling petitioner to release on bail, by the jailor, pursuant to a fixed bail
schedule in one case and the terms of the warrant in the other. . . . [No rea-
son to assume that petitioner would not have been able to post the required bail
bond had he been given the opportunity to do so [appears]. . . . Unless, and until,
it was determined that petitioner was about to be placed in the jail, there was no
necessity for the search which was made. The search was unlawful.
Id. at 793, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
88. 7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854. This result is reached
since Vehicle Code section 40302 (see note 83 supra) requires that an offender taken
into custody be brought "without unnecessary delay" before a magistrate or other appro-
priate official, and Vehicle Code section 40307 (CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40307 (West
Supp. 1974)) requires that the offender must be immediately released by the magistrate
or other official upon posting of bail or the written promise of the offender to appear.
7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The court in Simon did
not explain why the Vehicle Code procedure for arrests was exclusive, although the
key to that conclusion is found in People v. Wohlleben, 261 Cal. App. 2d 461, 67
Cal. Rptr. 826 (1968), a case the Simon court cited. In Wohileben, the court inter-
preted Vehicle Code section 40300 which reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for
violations of this code without a warrant for offenses committed in their presence,
but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive of any other
method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense
of like grade.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40300 (West 1971).
The Wohlleben court stated that:
The insertion of the word "otherwise" in the second clause of section 40300 can
only mean that to the extent stated in the first clause the arrest procedure of the
Vehicle Code is exclusive. Thus . . . the procedure on arrests without a warrant
for misdemeanor Vehicle Code violations is that prescribed by the Vehicle Code
and not the procedure prescribed by the Penal Code.
261 Cal. App. 2d at 463, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
89. 7 Cal. 3d at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854. See note 84 supra.
90. Id. at 209, 496 P.2d at 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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able overlap of constitutional and statutory reasoning is apparent. The
court quoted extensively from the New York case, People v. Marsh,91
which decided the same issue on the basis of both New York statutes
and the fourth amendment.92  The court in Marsh felt that the effect
of New York statutes was to make a full search of a traffic violator
taken into custody impermissible9 3 The court stated:
[T]he Legislature never intended to authorize a search of a traffic
offender unless, when the vehicle is stopped, there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the officer is in danger or there is probable
cause for believing that the offender is guilty of a crime rather than
merely a simple traffic infraction ....
[T]he statutory scheme does not contemplate treating him
as a common criminal to be booked, photographed, fingerprinted and
jailed. It is equally degrading-and most assuredly not the Legisla-
ture's intention-to subject him to the affront of a search when one
is not necessary. .. ,.9"
This language, when considered in light of the court's references
to the basically non-criminal nature of -traffic violations and the spec-
ially-designed "arrest" procedures for such transgressions,95 implies
that the Vehicle Code itself was the basis, in the supreme court's opin-
ion, for the different search and seizure policy in traffic arrests.
It would seem that the Simon court could have said that this statu-
tory -procedure indicated an intent by the legislature to limit the right
of a police officer to arrest a traffic offender (in the traditional sense
of the term) and thus an intent to limit the right to search.96 Such
91. 228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1967).
92. Id. at 785-86. Marsh was essentially a statement by the court that it had
decided the case on dual grounds, both the statutory provisions and constitutional con-
siderations. The majority opinion held that the search "would offend against the legis-
lative design for the treatment of traffic offenders . . . [and] would also exceed con-
stitutional limits on search and seizure." Id. at 785. The court then discussed the in-
tent and effect of statutory provisions and concluded that the search was impermissible.
Id. at 785-86. Again the court noted that its "conclusion is also dictated by the con-
stitutional prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures."' Id. at 786.
93. Id. at 785-86. Both the New York statutes regarding vehicle code arrests and
the California provisions provide for a citation procedure and for an immediate right
to release on bail if the offender is taken into custody.
94. Id. at 786.
95. See notes 74-88 supra and accompanying text.
96. One problem in reaching the decision in Simon is the absence of reports of the
legislature's actual intent. The problem of discerning the intent of the legislature is gen-
erally a difficult one in California. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Ezer, Legislative Research
in California: The Unchartered Wilderness, 35 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 116 (1960). The
court in People v. Mercurio, 10 Cal. App. 3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970), however,
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a conclusion would then be analytically identical to that portion of the
Marsh opinion where the court decided the same issue, reaching the
felt that the meaning of the Vehicle Code sections regarding arrest procedures "is quite
evident from the sections, themselves, and reference by us to earlier enactments and to
semantics is not required." Id. at 431, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 753. Indeed, it is evident that
the "Illegislature has created distinctions among the kinds of traffic offenses, and those
distinctions are helpful in the judicial determination of the reasonableness of the search
of traffic arrestees." Pugh v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 1187, 91 Cal. Rptr.
168, 170 (1970). Nevertheless, a review of the development of the present Vehicle
Code provisions involved in the Robinson-Simon problem is useful.
The most important conclusion which can be drawn from a review of the history
of the present California Vehicle Code provisions for arrests (CAL. VmICLE CODE ANN.
§ 40300 et seq. (West 1971)) is that there has always been a distinction between traf-
fic offenders and criminal misdemeanants, and, consequently, a distinction in arrest pro-
cedures.
In the first act regulating traffic and vehicle operation (ch. 612, H§ 1-10, [1905]
Cal. Stat. 816-22) violations were made misdemeanors (ch. 612, § 6, [1905] Cal. Stat.
821), and offenders taken into custody were required to be brought before the nearest
justice of the peace for an immediate hearing (ch. 612, § 6(2), [1905] Cal. Stat. 821-22).
From 1913 until 1915 the arrest procedure of the 1905 act was not in force due to
legislation amending the vehicle laws which repealed all previous laws. Ch. 326, § 40,
[1913] Cal. Stat. 656. In 1915, however, a citation procedure was enacted which pro-
vided for immediate release unless the arrestee demanded an appearance before a mag-
istrate. Ch. 188, § 22(c), [1915] Cal. Stat. 409. Then in 1919, the arrest provision
was amended to provide for an immediate release and the granting of a continuance
following an appearance before a magistrate and upon the posting of bail or making
a promise to appear. Ch. 147, § 13, [1919] Cal. Stat. 220, 222.
In 1923 the California Vehicle Act was passed which also provided for a citation
procedure (ch. 266, § 154, [1923] Cal. Stat. 566-67), the right to demand an appearance
before a magistrate, a continuance, and immediate release upon a promise to appear
or the posting of bail if the arrestee failed to promise to appear. Id. That act also
provided authority to take the offender before a magistrate if he refused to promise
to appear in situations in which a citation was authorized. Id.
The requirement that a driver carry identification first arose in 1925 and implied
that an offender's failure to produce satisfactory identification required that he appear
before a magistrate. Ch. 240, § 154, [1925] Cal. Stat. 415.
The present Vehicle Code was enacted in 1935 (ch. 27, § 1-803, [1935] Cal. Stat.
93-247), and provided then, as it does today, that arrestees for felonies are treated
as other felons. Ch. 27, § 735, [1935] Cal. Stat. 236-37 (CAL. VEMCLE CODE ANN.
§ 40301 (West 1971)). The 1935 code also provided for mandatory and discretionary
appearances before a magistrate in specified situations. Ch. 27, § 736-37, [1935] Cal.
Stat. 237-38 (CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40302 (West Supp. 1974); id. § 40303 (West
1971)). The immediate release provision of previous acts was retained (CAL. VE-
mCLE CODE ANN. § 40306 (West 1971)), and the citation procedure was retained. Ch.
27, § 739, [19351 Cal. Stat. 329 (CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 40500 et seq. (West
1971)).
The one change in language since the enactment of the 1935 Code, which at first
appears to be of significance to the problem here, is the change from the requirement
that an offender taken into custody be transported "immediately" before a magistrate,
to the requirement that he be taken "without unnecessary delay." Ch. 802, §§ 1-2,
[1951] Cal. Stat. 2289-90. This change, however, was not meant to permit an exten-
sion per se in the period of custody, but rather was meant to allow an arresting officer
the necessary time to locate the magistrate, or if he were unavailable, his clerk, or to
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same result on the basis of New York statutes.9 7  From a reading of
Simon, however, there was no expression by the court that it had in
fact relied on the statutory scheme of the California Vehicle Code.
On the other hand, nothing in the opinion remotely suggests that the
statutory framework could not be employed as an independent basis
for the result.
C. California's "Fourth Amendment"
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the Simon opinion is its failure
to even mention that the California constitution could have been re-
lied upon as an independent basis for the result, but the opinion does
not consider the issue and does not rely on any cases which employ
the California constitution as authority.
Article I, section 19 of the California constitution is almost identical
to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution:
The ight of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons and things to be seized. 98
The California Supreme Court has considered this provision in past
search and seizure cases,99 and, in the past, the court has not felt con-
take the offender to the officer in charge of the nearest jail facility for release on bail.
See 22 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 230 (1953). See Briefs for Appellant and Respondent,
Reply Brief for Appellant, People v. Mercurio, 10 Cal. App. 3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750
(1970).
97. See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
98. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The California Supreme Court has stated that the rights protected by article I, section
19 and the fourth amendment are essentially identical. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
99. Since the provisions of both article I, section 19 and the fourth amendment are
so similar, the California Supreme Court, in most instances where article I, section 19 is
mentioned at all, cite both it and the fourth amendment as duplicate protections from
unreasonable search and seizure. See People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 879, 512 P.2d
1208, 1214, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 310 (1973); People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 795, 511
P.2d 1204, 1209, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1973); People v. Peterson, 9 Cal. 3d 717,
730, 511 P.2d 1187, 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 835, 845 (1973); Lorenzana v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 631, 511 P.2d 33, 37, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973); Alexander
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 387, 390, 508 P.2d 1131, 1133, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483, 485
(1973); People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 179, 501 P.2d 918, 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350,
353 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 863 (1973); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 733,
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strained to limit the protection afforded to criminal suspects and de-
fendants when the United States Supreme Court has decreed that par-
497 P.2d 1121, 1136, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 400 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947
(1973); People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 286, 496 P.2d 1261, 1263, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 895 (1972); People v. Medina, 7 Cal. 3d 30, 36, 496 P.2d 433, 437, 101
Cal. Rptr. 521, 525 (1972); Halpin v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 885, 902, 495 P.2d
1295, 1307, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 387 (1972) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
982 (1972); Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 161, 491 P.2d 1, 7, 98 Cal. Rptr.
649, 655 (1971); People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 842, 471 P.2d 19, 23, 87 Cal. Rptr.
699, 703 (1970); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 84, 460 P.2d 129, 131, 81 Cal. Rptr.
457, 459 (1969); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1100, 458 P.2d 713, 715, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 635 (1969); People v. Scoma, 71 Cal. 2d 332, 335, 455 P.2d 419, 421, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 491, 494 (1969); People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 110, 424 P.2d 342, 344, 56
Cal. Rptr. 902, 904 (1967); Sokol v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 255, 418
P.2d 265, 270, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1966); People v. Gallegos, 62 Cal. 2d 176, 180,
397 P.2d 174, 177, 41 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593 (1964); People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 862,
395 P.2d 889, 890, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842 (1964); People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268,
275, 391 P.2d 393, 397, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1964); People v. Edgar, 60 Cal. 2d 171, 116,
383 P.2d 449, 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1963); Britt v. Superior Court, 59 Cal, 2d
469, 470, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.
2d'602, 604, 371 P.2d 288, 289, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 553 (1962); People v. Privett, 55
Cal. 2d 698, 703, 361 P.2d 602, 605, 12 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 (1961); People v. Kemp,
55 Cal. 2d 458, 478, 359 P.2d 913, 924, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361, 372 (1961); Wirin v.
Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 893, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957); People v. Duroncelay, 49 Cal.
2d 766, 773, 312 P.2d 690, 694 (1957) (dissent); People v. Dixon, 46 Cal. 2d 456,
459, 296 P.2d 557, 559 (1956) (concurring opinion); People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253,
258, 294 P.2d 13, 16 (1956) (dissent); People v. Sanders, 46 Cal. 2d 247, 252, 294
P.2d 10, 13 (1956) (dissent); People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 161-62, 293 P.2d
40, 46 (1956); People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 109, 293 P.2d 52, 54 (1956) (dis-
sent); People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d 59, 63, 292 P.2d 517, 519 (1956); Rogers v. Su-
perior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 10, 291 P.2d 929, 933 (1955); People v. Brown, 45 Cal.
2d 640, 642, 290 P.2d 528, 529 (1955); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 766, 264 P.Zd
513, 518 (1953) (dissent); People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 258, 260 P.2d 8, 11
(1953); People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 171, 137 P.2d 1, 3 (1943); People v. GOnza-
les, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 168-69, 124 P.2d 44, 46 (1942); People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535,
546, 102 P. 517, 521 (1909); Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 294, 28g, 9 P. 173, 175 (1885).
In a number of instances, the court has discussed the fact that in the area of search
and seizure, article I, section 19 and the fourth amendment both protect personal privacy
and are essentially identical. See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 891-92 n.5, 506 P.2d
232, 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 413 n.5 (1973) (see text accompanying note 113
infra); People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973)
(see text accompanying notes 103-09 infra); People v. Myers, 6 Cal. 3d 811, 814 n1.1,
494 P.2d 684, 685 n.1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613 n.1 (1972) ("[rjeference hereinafter
to Fourth Amendment rights are intended to include not only the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as proscribed by the Fourth Amendment of the fed-
eral Constitution but also 'by article I, section 19, of the California Constitution")
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955) (rights, are "essen-
tially identical"). However, in some cases the court has at least impliedly indicated
that there was some distinction despite the obvious similarity. See Stapleton v. Supe-
rior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100 n.2, 447 P.2d 967, 969 n.2, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577 n.Z
(1968) (search conducted by a private individual not protected by the fourth amend-
ment but here individual was acting as agent for police. The court commented:
"[Wle express no opinion ...as to their application to the proper interpretation of
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ticular procedures are not necessary to assure compliance with the re-
quirements of the United States Constitution. In a number of instances,
the California Supreme Court has extended greater protection to crimi-
nal defendants than that afforded by the United States Constitution.'00
article I, section 19 of the California Constitution"); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418,
422 n.2, 439 P.2d 321, 324 n.2, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 n.2 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1080 (1969) (the court noted that article I, section 19 was "similar" to the fourth
amendment).
In other instances the court apparently decided a search and seizure issue solely on
the basis of article I, section 19 grounds. See Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789,
795, 362 P.2d 47, 51, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 419 (1961); People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d
714, 719, 361 P.2d 587, 589, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861 (1961); People v. Mayen, 188
Cal. 237, 241-42, 205 P. 435, 437 (1922); People v. Tipton, 73 Cal. 405, 408, 14 P.
894, 895 (1887).
In dealing with search and seizure issues in the civil context, the court has been more
apt to rely on the California constitutional provision. They have done so when con-
sidering discovery orders (see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161,
170 n.11, 465 P.2d 854, 860-61 n.11, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 724-25 n.11 (1970), quoting
West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 407, 415, 364 P.2d 295, 298,
15 Cal. Rptr. 119, 122 (1961)); subpoenas ducem tecum (see Strauss v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. 2d 396, 397, 224 P.2d 726, 727 (1950); Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 2d 206, 210, 100 P.2d 302, 304 (1940)); and orders to produce
books and records (see Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 394, 364
P.2d 266, 287, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 111 (1961); Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 673,
166 P.2d 268, 276 (1946) (dissent); Kutner-Goldstein Co. v. Superior Court, 212 Cal.
341, 346, 298 P. 1001, 1003 (1931); Hirschfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142, 153, 223 P. 451,
455 (1924); Ex parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 238, 58 P. 546, 547 (1899)). However,
the court has also based decisions in the civil area on both article I, section 19 and the
fourth amendment. They have done so regarding the claim and delivery statute (Blair
v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 264, 285, 486 P.2d 1242, 1246, 1261-62, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42,
46, 61-62 (1971); a political disclosure statute (City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young,
2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1970)); and orders to pro-
duce books and records (Paladini v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. 369, 373, 173 P. 588, 590
(1918)).
100. In a number of significant decisions the California Supreme Court has preceded
a similar decision by the United States Supreme Court. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.
3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), regarding the death penalty; People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
regarding the exclusionary rule; In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1965), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), regarding the right
to counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions. In each of those instances, the California
court's action was based on state grounds.
There are numerous other instances in which the court has used state grounds for
decisions involving "constitutional" problems. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 416,
503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (cruel or unusual punishment); Klopping v.
City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1972) (just com-
pensation in eminent domain); People v. Compton, 6 Cal. 3d 55, 490 P.2d 537, 98
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1971) (double jeopardy); Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470
P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (double jeopardy); In re Haro, 71 Cal. 2d 1021,
458 P.2d 500, 80 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1969) (right to counsel); People v. Superior Court,
67 Cal. 2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1967) (unanimous jury verdict);
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Four recent decisions of the California court illustrate the court's un-
derstanding of the relationship between the national and state search
and seizure provisions. In three of these cases the California rule was
ultimately retained, 1' 1 while in one instance the California rule was
modified to correspond with a decision of the United States Supreme
Court.102
A significant case for purposes of this analysis, People v. Krivda,08
deals with a search and seizure issue'0 and presents a situation ana-
In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967) (right to counsel,
speedy trial); In re Pere, 65 Cal. 2d 224, 418 P.2d 6, 53 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966)
(rights to be present, defend, and have counsel); People v. Clark, 62 Cal. 2d 870, 402
P.2d 856, 44 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1965) (right to speedy trial); People v. Henderson, 60
Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963) (double jeopardy); Cardenas v.
Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961) (double jeop-
ardy).
In numerous other cases, the court used both state and federal provisions in reaching
its decision. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973) (equal protection); People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 503 P.2d 594, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 138 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973) (ex post facto law); People v.
Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (due process); Curtis
v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972) (equal
protection); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (equal protection); McDermott v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d
693, 493 P.2d 1161, 100 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972) (excessive bail); Hayes v. Superior
Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137, 98 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1971) (equal protection); Ser-
rano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (equal protec-
tion); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (due process); Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby,
5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (equal protection); Richard M.
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971) (double jeop-
ardy); People v. Montalvo, 4 Cal. 3d 328, 482 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1971)
(jury trial); Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 734, 478 P.2d 10, 91 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1970) (speedy trial); In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15
(1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971) (equal protection); Prudhomme v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970) (self-incrimination); In re
Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968) (due process); People
v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 417 P.2d 868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966) (right to counsel);
Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 415 P.2d 809, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1966)
(speedy trial); People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884
(1964) (right to counsel); cases cited in note 99 supra.
101. Those cases are People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr.
521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232,
106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973); and Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1,
98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
102. People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
103. Krivda was first reported as People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262,
96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971). The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
vacated and remanded for a determination of whether the decision was based on federal
or state grounds. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, 35 (1972). The California Su-
preme Court stated that its prior decision was based on both state and United States
constitutional grounds and reiterated it in its entirety. 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457,
105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
104. In Krivda, police officers suspected the defendant of narcotics violations. They
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logous to Simon in that the Krivda court originally did not clearly indi-
cate whether its decision, holding the search invalid, could have in-
dependently been based on article I, section 19 of the California con-
stitution.10 5  The state then appealed .to the Supreme Court.106  The
policy of the Court in cases where the basis of the state court's deci-
sion is unclear has been to vacate and remand for a clarification by
the state court.107  In Krivda, the California Supreme Court stated, on
remand, that, "We relied upon both the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 19, of the California
Constitution, and. . . accordingly the latter provision furnished an in-
dependent ground to support the result. . .. "1011 The only mention
of the California constitutional provision in Krivda, however, was by
way of citation to another case which had expressly relied on article
I, section 19.109
Another pertinent case is People v. Triggs,"10 which dealt with the
clandestine observation by a police officer, without a warrant, of homo-
sexual activity in a public restroom. 11 In Triggs, the California
court spoke of the "Fourth Amendments prohibition of unreasonable
arranged for a garbage collection vehicle to isolate the garbage which had been set out
for collection at the Krivda residence. A subsequent search of that garbage by the po-
lice officers revealed marijuana. 5 Cal. 3d at 360, 486 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 63.
105. The Supreme Court wrote:
[We are unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court based its
holding upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, or upon the equivalent provision of the California Constitution, or
both.
409 U.S. at 35.
106. See note 103 supra.
107. The Supreme Court cited three prior cases in which it had vacated a state court
decision and remanded for a decision as to the basis of the state court's decision. They
were Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965) (a California
case dealing with liability imposed on estates or relatives of persons cared for in state
mental institutions); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) (a Minnesota
decision holding a graduated gross income tax to be unconstitutional); and State Tax
Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939) (a Utah decision regarding tax exemption
status).
108. 8 Cal. 3d at 624, 504 P.2d at 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
109. The Krivda decision relied on People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d
713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969), cited at 5 Cal. 3d at 360, 486 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 64. That decision was based on both the fourth amendment and article I,
section 19, as are numerous other cases. See note 99 supra. The Edwards court men-
tioned article I, section 19 expressly (71 Cal. 2d at 1100, 458 P.2d at 715, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 635), and then referred to the "Fourth Amendment," the "Constitution," and various
United States Supreme Court cases. Id.
110. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
111. Id. at 888-89, 506 P.2d at 234-35, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
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searches.""' 2 But their decision was also based on the parallel protec-
tion afforded by the California Constitution:
Although for the sake of convenience we often refer to constitutional
guarantees, both state and federal, against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the rubric of "Fourth Amendment" rights, our decision
today is based both upon our reading of applicable Fourth Amendment
law and our own determination of the proper construction of article I,
section 19 .... 13
An especially important factor in the Triggs decision, which is anal.
ogous to the situation in Simon, is the effect of a statute which pro.
hibited the use of two-way mirrors in public restrooms." 4 The court
considered that statute to be the legislature's "declaration of . . . the
reasonability of expectations of privacy in restrooms."" 6 Thus, al-
though prior lower court decisions had upheld the validity of similar
clandestine observations on the basis of the lack of a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" by the offender," 6 the Triggs court felt that the
" 'method of surveillance employed in this case . . . violates the spirit
and policy considerations which led to the enactment of [the stat-
ute].' 117 The Vehicle Code provisions of Simon, expressly limiting
the arrest process, would seem to be at least as closely tied to that
court's resulting limitation on the right to search incident to an arrest
as the "two-way statute" of Triggs was to its result."'
112. Id. at 891, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
113. Id. at 892 n.5, 506 P.2d at 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 413 n.5.
114. The statute in question provided in part:
Any person who installs or who maintains ... any two-way mirror permitting ob-
servation of any restroom, toilet, [etc.], is guilty of a misdemeanor.
'Two-way mirror" as used in this section means a mirror or other surface which
permits any person on one side thereof to see through it . . . while any person
on the other side . . . can see only the usual mirror or other surface reflection.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653n (West 1972).
115. 8 Cal. 3d at 893, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
116. Lower court decisions had, in some instances, turned on whether the illegal ac-
tivity had occurred in open toilet stalls (i.e., stalls without doors), thus affording only
a limited "expectation of privacy," or in closed stalls with a resulting greater expecta-
tion of privacy. See People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968);
People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); People v. Maldonado,
240 Cal. App. 2d 812, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1966); People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834,
43 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492
(1963); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962). But see
People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1971); People v. Crafts,
13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970).
117. 8 Cal. 3d at 893, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414, quoting People v. Met-
calf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 23, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (1971).
118. See notes 74-97 supra and accompanying text.
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Similarly, in Kaplan v. Superior Court,119 the California Supreme
Court retained an extension of the federally-dictated protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures. In 1955, in People v. Martin,'20
the California Supreme Court had held that a defendant could assert
the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence, even though that evi-
dence was obtained as a result of a violation of another person's fourth
amendment rights. 2 . The United States Supreme Court subsequently
made it clear in Alderman v. United States 22 that one did not have
"vicarious standing" to assert such violations.123  Yet, the Kaplan court
chose to retain the "vicarious standing' rule in California,' 24 basing its
decision in part on the failure of the legislature to change the Martin
rule in the creation of the California Evidence Code.'
25
The one recent exception to the retention of California rules in the
area of fourth amendment and article I, section 19 protections is that
of People v. McKinnon, 26 which adopted the rationale of -the Supreme
Court in Chambers v. Maroney. 27 Prior to McKinnon and Chambers,
,the California Supreme Court, in People v. McGrew'28 and Abt v.
Superior Court,'29 had held that warrantless searches by airline
employees of cartons which were to be transported by the airline vio-
lated the rights of their passengers -to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 30 In deciding McKinnon, however, the court
determined that "the reasoning of -the United States Supreme Court
in Chambers. . .undermines . .McGrew and Abt."'' Apparent-
119. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
120. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
121. Id. at 759-60, 290 P.2d at 857. The rule is referred to by the court as the
"vicarious exclusionary rule." Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d at 153, 491 P.2d at
2, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
122. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
123. Id. at 171-76.
124. 6 Cal. 3d at 153, 161, 491 P.2d at 2, 7-8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 650, 655-56.
125. The Kaplan decision discussed the enactment of the California Evidence Code,
which was a product of the California Law Revision Commission's "painstaking
analysis of many evidentiary rules that are of far less importance and notoriety
than Martin." Id. at 159, 491 P.2d at 6, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 654. Thus the court con-
cluded that the failure to affirmatively alter the rule of Martin in the code meant that
the legislature did not iztend to change that rule. Id.
126. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
127. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
128. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
129. 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P.2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969).
130. 1 Cal. 3d at 408-09, 462 P.2d at 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476; 1 Cal. 3d at 420-
21, 462 P.2d at 11, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
131. 7 Cal. 3d at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904. It is noteworthy
that in this instance, in which the California Supreme Court deferred to a later decision
1974]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ly unwilling in this instance to extend the protection from unreason-
able search and seizure on California constitutional grounds, the court
overruled its prior decisions.
There is ample precedent, then, for the California Supreme Court
to hold that the broad, "full search" incident to custodial arrest allowed
by the United States Supreme Court is not and should not be the law
in California. One distinction between the previous cases and the
Simon decision, however, is the lack of any mention of the state con-
stitutional provisions in Simon. As previously noted, the constitutional
references which are present relate to the fourth amendment.
18 2
There does not appear to be a source of "confusion," as the United
States Supreme Court found in Krlvda, as to which constitutional
theory was used by Justice Mosk in Simon. The Supreme Court dis-
cerned confusion in Krivda because it relied primarily on a prior Cali-
fornia holding which did expressly rest on the California constitution's
analogue of the fourth amendment. 188 In none of the .prior instances
where article I, section 19 was applied did the California court refer
to a previous decision and say, in effect, that, even though the court
did not explicitly state the proposition in the previous instance, the
prior case did in fact rest on both the state constitution and the fourth
amendment. This is essentially the dilemma facing the California
court if, in the future, it wishes to avoid the Robinson/Gustafson
theory on the basis of the state constitution as applied in Simon.
One possible solution is the language in Triggs' indicating that "the
rubric of 'Fourth Amendment' rights" is often used as a shorthand ref-
erence for both state and federal guarantees.' Such language might
reflect the understanding that California search and seizure decisions
impliedly rest on both the United States and state constitutions despite
the absence of express adoption of an independent state ground.
Within one month of the Robinson and Gustafson decisions, how-
ever, a 'California Court of Appeal considered and decided the case
by the United States Supreme Court, the overruled cases had clearly been based on
fourth amendment grounds, with express references made to that amendment and no
mention made of article I, section 19. See People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d at 409, 410-11,
462 P.2d at 4, 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476, 477; Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d at 420,
462 P.2d at 11, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
132. See notes 54-73 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 109 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 113 supra and note 99 supra (regarding People v.
Myers and People v. Cahan quoted therein).
135. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
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of People v. Norman,"8' wherein the court followed the example of
McKinnon'3 7 and held that Simon had been overruled as a result of
the Supreme Court decisions on the Simon "custodial arrest" issue.
The facts of the case were clearly distinguishable from the Simon, Rob-
inson, and Gustafson fact situations, but Justice Thompson, the author
of the opinion, decided that the issues presented were identical. 138 Jus-
tice Thompson focused on the state and national constitutional issues
in Simon and did not discuss the statutory considerations of that case.
McKinnon was the preferable approach to be taken, in his opinion,
because of that decision's deference to rulings of the United States
Supreme Court." 9 Such deference was said to be -appropriate be-
cause:
By the nature of federal and state jurisdiction that court has acquired
a degree of expertise not shared by any state court. Matters of con-
stitutional import are likely to reach the United States high court on
a cleaner record and to be better briefed and argued than are similar
issues in -the state system. The persuasion of the United States
Supreme Court decisions is particularly strong in the area of search and
seizure and the exclusionary rule. California courts have for years
spoken of the basis of the exclusionary rule as the Fourth Amendment.
A sudden switch to a California ground to avoid the impact of federal
high court decisions invites the successful use of the initiative process
136. 112 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1974), hearing granted, Crim. No. 17643, Cal. Sup. CL, Mar.
20, 1974.
137. See notes 126-31 supra and accompanying text.
138. 112 Cal. Rptr. at 44, 50. Norman appears to be distinguishable on the basis
of the factual situation therein. After a lengthy chase, involving several traffic viola-
tions, an initial stopping in which the defendant allegedly stated "Fuck you, cop," and
a subsequent chase, the defendant stopped his van and exited holding a black object
in his hand. The approaching officer cautioned Norman, who then threw the object un-
der the van. Inspection of the object, which made no discernible sound when it struck
the ground, revealed marijuana and seconal. Id. at 44-45.
The case was argued on appeal on the basis of Simon and prior to the decision in
Robinson. No supplemental briefs were requested regarding the possible effect of the
Robinson decision on Simon or on the Norman case. Interview with Dennis A. Fischer,
Deputy Public Defender, Los Angeles County, California, in Los Angeles, Feb. 15,
1974.
In a case involving a similar factual situation, the court wrote:
The officer saw defendant throw the bag, and it was readily inferable that he saw
it land and that it remained in plain sight on the ground. . . . The police are
not required to close their eyes to items in plain sight.
People v. Duke, 276 Cal. App. 2d 630, 636, 81 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1969). Thus, since
the material was in plain view, there was no search, and, therefore, no unreasonable
seizure. See, e.g., People v. Irvin, 264 Cal. App. 2d 747, 753-55, 70 Cal. Rptr. 892,
895-97 (1968); People v. Escobosa, 179 Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 3 Cal. Rptr. -917, 919
(1960).
139. 112 Cal. Rptr. at 48-50.
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to overrule the California decision with its concomitant harm to the
prestige, influence, and function of the judicial branch of state govern-
ment. The very purpose of the exclusionary rule, to deter unlawful
police searches . . . , requires that there be certainty in the ground
rules of search and seizure. The more courts feel free to adopt
ground rules unpersuaded by contrary decisions of other courts, the
greater the likelihood there is of uncertainty in those ground rules.
The uncertainty is mitigated if proper deference is paid United States
Supreme Court holdings'
140
Indeed, Justice Thompson maintained that
the state system should accept the interpretation of the United States
Supreme Court of language in the federal Constitution as controlling
of our interpretation of essentially identical language in the California
Constitution unless conditions peculiar to California support a different
meaning.1
41
Such a position seems to rest on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of the federal system. Even when the United States
Supreme Court construes "identical language" it construes that lan-
guage in light of the basic values of the body politic. The "reasonable-
ness" of a search can only be determined by a balancing of the com-
peting values of privacy and order. Those values are weighed by the
United States Supreme Court, informed by a wise appreciation of the
underlying traditions and values of the American people from all of
the states. Members of the United States Supreme Court are consti-
tutionally presumed to be the most qualified to make these judgments,
but this presumption in no way extends to interpretations of the Cali-
fornia constitution which must be interpreted in light of Cali-
fornia traditions and values. If the California Supreme Court
were to adopt Justice Thompson's suggestion, it not only would abdi-
cate its constitutional responsibility to independently interpret the Cali-
fornia constitution, but also would abdicate it to a body which, although
interpreting identical language, does so on a basis that is potentially ir-
relevant to California values. Justice Thompson complains that the
adoption of an interpretation of the California constitution in order to
avoid review by the Supreme Court raises questions about the "intellec-
tual integrity" of the court.142  Far from it. It rather gives substance
to Justice Black's observation that:
It is always time to say that this nation is too large, too complex and
140. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 49 n.9.
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composed of too great a diversity of peoples for [the Court] to have
the wisdom to establish the rules by which local Americans must govern
their local affairs .... I suspect this is a most propitious time to re-
member the words of the late Judge Learned Hand, who so wisely
said: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy
of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not.
143
And perhaps it is also time .to say with Justice Frankfurter that the
fourteenth amendment "is not the basis of a uniform code of criminal
procedure federally imposed. Alternative methods of arriving at truth
are not-they must not be-forever frozen. There is room for growth
and vitality, for adaptation to shifting necessities .... ,,144
But even if one were to accept the premises of the Norman opin-
ion, the conclusion that Robinson controls Simon need not obtain.
Justice Thompson's express denial that there were "conditions peculiar
to California' 1 45 which might warrant a different result than that
reached by the Supreme Court is not convincing. While Simon was
not as clear on this point as one might hope, one cannot just ignore
the California Vehicle Code provisions which were prominently men-
tioned in that case. 46
CONCLUSION
If the Norman case becomes the vehicle by which the California
Supreme Court resolves the conflict between the Robinson and Simon
decisions,' 47 there are important considerations whioh will be weighed,
both in the context of the Norman case and its search and seizure
issues, and in the larger context of whether the overall protection of
individual rights is to rest on the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the "Burger Court," or on some balance between the United
States and the California Constitutions.
48
143. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547-48 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
144. F. FRANKFuRTER, IAW AND PoLrrIcs 192-93 (1939), quoted in Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 954 (1965).
145. No similar declared public policy [to that of the Penal Code provision in
Triggs] or other condition peculiar to California exists with respect to searches
incident to custodial arrest for violations of traffic laws the issue presented by the
case at bench.
112 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
146. See notes 74-97 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 136 & 138 supra. It seems likely that the Norman decision will
be distinguished factually by the California Supreme Court. It is also possible that the
court may simply not decide the case, meaning that the Court of Appeal opinion will
not be published, an option within the supreme court's power. CAL. CoNsr. art. VI,
§ 14; CAL. R. CT. 976.
148. See Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" State Ground, 61
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The resolution of the immediate conflict ultimately seems to call
for a balancing of values by the state court: the obvious necessity on
the one side of insuring the safety of police officers; on the other side,
the importance of protecting individual liberties (the right of privacy
and the right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion)
where persons have committed only the most minor of "crimes." This
conflict may be resolved by adopting the view of Chief Justice Wright,
who, in his concurring opinion in Simon, urged the approval of a pat-
down search in situations calling for the traffic offender to be taken
into custody.149  In no instance, however, does it appear likely that
the California court would go as far as Justice Rehnquist,'" who
placed the greatest weight on the side of protecting police by authoriz-
ing a full search. The outer limits of any decision would seem to be
the position taken by Justice Marshall, that items may be removed
from arrestees, but that additional inspection is impermissible. 1:
In reaching a decision in Norman or in another similar case, the
California Supreme Court must still resolve the larger conflict, which
is perhaps a product of the change in basic outlook between the "War-
ren Court" and the "Burger Court." That conflict involves the basic
question of judicial consideration of state constitutional and statutory
provisions in areas also covered by national constitutional provisions.
At least one commentator has urged that any judicial decision logically
should be based first on statutory considerations if possible, then on
state constitutional provisions, and only if it is necessary to reach a
decision, on national constitutional grounds. 2  Justice Thompson, in
Norman, urged deference to the fourth amendment as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in cases involving search and seizure questions."'
That deference was seen by the Norman court as a way of avoiding
CALIF. L. R.av. 273 (1973); Thompson, The Burger Court in the California Crystal Ball,
5 Sw. L.J. 238 (1973) (written by the author of the Norman decision).
149. 7 Cal. 3d at 212, 496 P.2d at 1224, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 856. It is arguable that,
since Chief Justice Wright concurred with the majority and since Justices McComb and
Burke concurred with Wright, all seven Justices supported the proposition that a full
search was not justified by a custodial traffic arrest, thus putting all of the California
justices in a position contrary to the Robinson court.
150. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 O". L.
Rav. 125, 182 (1970). Professor Linde wrote:
To begin with the federal claim, as is customarily done, implicitly admits that the
guarantees of the state's constitution are ineffective to protect the asserted right
and that only the intervention of the federal constitution stands between the claim-
ant and the state.
153. 112 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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the" 'whims of the [California] Court's membership.' ,154 Yet it certain-
ly must be true that the California Supreme Court is required to be
sensitive to its own unique responsibility, as the final interpreter of
California law, to insure that laws created by the people of California,
if not offensive to the United States Constitution, are properly applied.
Indeed, that argument ha§ the support of the author of the Simon
opinion:
[W]e are fortunate to have a perfectly good Constitution in California
and I, as one-seventh of the Supreme Court of our state, am perfectly
content in general to decide cases involving fundamental rights on the
basis of the Constitution of California1 55
John D. Vandevelde
154. Id.
155. Address by Justice Mosk, California State Bar Annual Convention-Luncheon
for University of Chicago Law School Alumni, Sept. 12, 1973, reported in L.A. Daily
Journal Report, Dec. 19, 1973, at 26.
19741
